Introduction
Designing rules/mechanisms that achieve desirable properties is a central research topic in the literature of mechanism design and social choice theory. An assignment problem is de ned by a set of indivisible goods and a set of agents, and the purpose is to compute an assignment of goods to agents such that no good is assigned more than once. Such an assignment should prescribe a socially desirable outcome in the sense that the assignment should re ect the preferences of the agents over goods. In this paper we study the exchange problems which is a particular assignment problem with following properties: (i) each agent is initially endowed with a set of indivisible goods, (ii) each agent has a strict ordinal preference relation (shortly, a preference) over the set of possible bundles of goods, and (iii) compensation using monetary transfers is prohibited. e ex- change problem has many real applications, such as on-campus university housing markets (Chen & Sönmez, 2002) and nation-wide kidney exchanges (Roth, Sönmez, &Ünver, 2004) . Core-selection is one of the most well-studied properties that exchange rules are expected to achieve. An exchange rule is said to be core-selecting if no group of agents has an incentive to make a cartel and trade their goods among themselves. By de nition, core-selecting rules encourage agents to participate in the rules (i.e., implies individual rationality) and result in a Pareto e cient trade of goods, which in a sense is a socially optimal outcome. When each agent is assumed to be initially endowed with a single indivisible good, Gale's Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) procedure is known to be core-selecting (Shapley & Scarf, 1974; Roth & Postlewaite, 1977) .
Another common requirement is strategy-proofness, which requires that each agent has no incentive to misreport her preference. To be more precise, for each agent, submi ing her true preference to the exchange rule is a dominant strategy.
is is a quite strong requirement for agents' incentives. Actually, Sönmez (1999) showed that, when there is at least one agent who initially owns more than one good and the agents' preferences over bundles of goods are strict, as in our exchange problems, there exists no rule that is simultaneously strategy-proof and coreselecting in general.
In the wake of this impossibility, we tackle the incentive issue from the perspective of computational complexity. e idea is as follows: even if an agent is sel sh and hopes to bene t by misreporting, if nding a bene cial misreport is hard, e.g., it requires to solve an NP-hard problem, and its power of computation is limited, then it will refrain from doing such a manipulation. Under this assumption, in a sense, the NP-hardness of nding a bene cial preference misreport guarantees that agents do not have strong incentive to misreport their preferences. Such a complexity approach for agents' incentives has a racted much a ention from computer scientists, especially in the literature of computational social choice (Bartholdi, Tovey, & Trick, 1989; Pini, Rossi, Venable, & Walsh, 2011) .
In the exchange problem, agents have preferences over bundles of goods. Describing preferences by an exhaustive ordering of the bundles may be infeasible whenever the number of goods is too large. Indeed, the number of bundles growths exponentially with the number of goods. erefore, compact representations are worth considering for representing preferences of the agents in our exchange problem. e lexicographic preferences are a well studied restriction over the preference domain which allows a compact representation of the preferences (Saban & Sethuraman, 2014; Todo, Sun, & Yokoo, 2014; Aziz, Kalinowski, Walsh, & Xia, 2016) . Indeed, under this restriction the preferences over bundles can be fully described by an ordering over goods. Informally speaking, lexicographic preferences are de ned as follows. In order to compare two bundles of goods, we start by comparing their most preferred goods. If the most preferred good in one bundle is preferred to the most preferred good in the other bundle then the former bundle is preferred to the later one. Otherwise, we compare the second most preferred goods of those bundles, and in case of equality, we compare the third most preferred goods, and so on. Let us consider an illustrative example with three goods: beef (B), cake (C) and white wine (W) . Suppose that B is preferred to C which is preferred to W. In lexicographic preferences model, the preferences over bundle is {B, C, W} {B, C} {B, W} {B} {C, W} {C} {W}, where means that the le part is strictly preferred to the right part.
e drawback of focusing on lexicographic preference domain is that such restriction seems too strong to re ect real preferences. In this paper we focus on a larger preference domain over bundles of goods, called conditionally lexicographic preferences, which was introduced by Booth, A C A C S E Chevaleyre, Lang, Mengin, and Somba heera (2010) . Lexicographic preferences are a special case of conditionally lexicographic preferences. But the compact representation used to represent conditionally lexicographic preferences is richer in the sense that the ordering over goods may be conditional to the existence of some more preferred goods in the bundle. Let us change our example by replacing white wine with red wine (R). In that case, the preferences of an agent over the red wine and the cake may be di erent if she obtains the beef or not. For example, she may prefer R to C if she has B, and otherwise she prefers C to R. In that case, the preferences over bundles would be the following: {B, C, R} {B, R} {B, C} {B} {C, R} {C} {R}. Note that such preferences are not lexicographic because C is once preferred to R and R is once preferred to C. Actually, the number of possible conditionally lexicographic preferences is exponentially larger than the number of possible lexicographic preferences (Booth et al., 2010) .
In this paper, we propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure for the exchange problem.
e proposed rule possesses nice properties in terms of quality of solutions and agents' incentives. Concerning the quality of solutions, the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. For agents' incentives, nding a bene cial misreport for a manipulator under the ATTC procedure is NP-hard. We also consider two di erent types of manipulations called splitting and hiding, and clarify their relationship with preference misreporting. We show that, for any given spli ing/hiding manipulation, there exists a corresponding preference misreport that gives the same bundle of goods to the manipulator, and such a misreport can be computed in polynomial time.
e paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review several existing works and clarify the di erence with our approach. In Section 3, we give the formal model of our exchange problems and de ne the conditionally lexicographic preferences. In Section 4, we de ne the ATTC procedure and illustrate its behavior by a simple example. In Section 5, we show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. In Section 6, we formalize the problem of nding a bene cial misreport under the ATTC procedure and show that it is NP-hard. In Section 7, we give the de nitions of spli ing and hiding manipulations, and present two algorithms to emulate these manipulations by misreporting preference. In Section 8, we conclude the paper and give some possible future research directions.
Related Works
e exchange model we deal with in this paper is a generalization of the well-studied housing market (Shapley & Scarf, 1974) , where each agent initially owns a single house, agents' preferences are strict, and monetary transfers are prohibited. In housing market literature, the TTC procedure is characterized by three properties: individual rationality, Pareto e ciency, and strategyproofness (Ma, 1994) . Moreover, it always chooses the unique core assignment (Roth & Postlewaite, 1977) . Other properties have been considered in AI, e.g., fairness (Endriss, Maudet, Sadri, & Toni, 2006; Lesca & Perny, 2010; Lesca, Minoux, & Perny, 2013) and envy-freeness (Chevaleyre, Endriss, & Maudet, 2007; de Keijzer, Bouveret, Klos, & Zhang, 2009) . Constraints on the set of possible allocations have also been considered, e.g., for exchanges over a social network (Gourvès, Lesca, & Wilczynski, 2017) . On the other hand, when at least one agent initially owns more than one house, as well as the impossibility result presented in the previous section advents, we can no longer guarantee the uniqueness of the core assignment (Sönmez, 1999) . Cechlárová (2009) studied the exchange problem for more than one type of goods and show that deciding the nonemptyness of the core is NP-hard even for two types of goods. Furthermore, Cechlárová and Lacko (2012) studied the core property for the kidney exchange problem. One common approach for going beyond such an impossibility result is to weaken one of the requirements. In the literature of exchange with multiple endowments, which is what we are dealing with in this paper, several strategy-proof rules have been developed by weakening the core-selecting property (Pápai, 2003 (Pápai, , 2007 Todo et al., 2014) . Various restriction over the preference domain have also been considered in the literature, such as binary domain (Luo & Tang, 2015) , asymmetric preferences (Sun, Hata, Todo, & Yokoo, 2015) , and additive preferences (Sonoda, Fujita, Todo, & Yokoo, 2014; Aziz, Biró, Lang, Lesca, & Monnot, 2016) .
Our approach maintains the core-selecting requirement, but weakens strategy-proofness by focusing on the computational hardness of bene cial manipulation. In various mechanism design/social choice problems, many works consider the computational hardness of bene cial manipulation, such as voting (Bartholdi et al., 1989) , two-sided matching (Teo, Sethuraman, & Tan, 2001; Pini et al., 2011) and sequential allocation (Aziz, Bouveret, Lang, & Mackenzie, 2017) . Although it has been pointed out that such a computational complexity approach is not always su cient as a barrier for agents' incentives (Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, & Hemaspaandra, 2010; Faliszewski & Procaccia, 2010) , we believe that discussing complexity of misreporting in exchange problems is an important rst step toward the development of useful exchange rules for self-interested agents in practice.
In this paper we also focus on the conditionally lexicographic preference domain. is restriction leads to compact representations of the agents' preferences, and makes sense whenever they are non compensatory (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) . us such preferences have been well studied in the AI community and especially in elicitation (Booth et al., 2010) and voting (Conitzer & Xia, 2012; Lang, Mengin, & Xia, 2012) . Responsive preferences are one of the most famous restriction over the preference domain in matching theory. Such domain of preferences generalize both lexicographic and additive preferences. Informally, the requirement for a preference to be responsive is that, for a given bundle of goods, the marginal contribution of an additional good only depends on the ordering over goods. Note that, according to the illustrative example provided earlier, conditionally lexicographic preferences may not be responsive.
Similar exchange rules as ATTC procedure have been studied in recent papers (Sikdar, Adalı, & Xia, 2017 , 2018 . Sikdar et al. (2017) consider an exchange problem where goods are partitioned into types (car, house, and so on). Each agent has initially a single good of each type and receives at the end of the procedure a single good of each type. erefore, preferences are over bundles of goods of same size with one good per type. Agents' preferences are represented by CP-nets where vertices represent types. In short, CP-nets are an oriented graphs which represent conditional preferences over types. e preferences over the goods of a given type will depend on the other goods allocated whose types are parents in the graph of the type under consideration. In the paper, the CP-nets considered are lexicographic i.e., there exists a linear order over the types such that a type can be the ancestor of another one only if the rst type precedes the second type in this linear order. is model somehow extends the one presented by Fujita et al. (2015) , where agent's preferences over the bundles of goods are lexicographic. However, the model of Sikdar et al. (2017) impose additional constraint on the admissible allocation (exactly one good per type) whereas such constraint does not appear in the paper of Fujita et al. (2015) . Conditionally lexicographic preferences considered in this paper generalize the model studied by Sikdar et al. (2017) except that it does not allow indi erences. On the other hand, the model of preferences considered
by Sikdar et al. (2018) generalizes conditionally lexicographic preferences in order to allow indifferences. Sikdar, Adali, and Xia (2017, 2018) show that TTC-like procedures for these two models of preferences are core-selecting. e e ect of spli ing manipulations has been studied in several algorithmic/economic environments, such as scheduling (Moulin, 2008) , voting (Conitzer, 2008; Todo, Iwasaki, & Yokoo, 2011) , combinatorial auctions (Yokoo, Sakurai, & Matsubara, 2004) , two-sided matching (Todo & Conitzer, 2013; Afacan, 2014) , and coalitional games (Aziz, Bachrach, Elkind, & Paterson, 2011; Yokoo, Conitzer, Sandholm, Ohta, & Iwasaki, 2005; Ohta, Conitzer, Satoh, Iwasaki, & Yokoo, 2008) , some of which are also known as false-name manipulations. Especially for the case of exchange problem, a class of exchange rules resistant to spli ing manipulations, as well as to another class of manipulations called hiding (Atlamaz & Klaus, 2007) , has been proposed by Todo et al. (2014) , while they do not satisfy the core-selecting property.
Preliminaries
In this section we provide the formal de nition for the exchange problem with multiple indivisible goods studied in this paper as well as several properties of exchange rules that have been discussed in the literature.
Notation
We consider set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} and nite set of heterogeneous indivisible goods K of size m. An assignment x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a partition of K into n subsets, where x i is the bundle of goods assigned to agent i under assignment x. We denote by X the set of all possible assignments.
e assignment of the goods to the agents is made based on their preferences, which are orders/rankings over bundles of goods. In this paper we focus on the domain of conditionally lexicographic preferences, in which a preferences over the bundles of goods are modeled by lexicographic preference trees (or LP-trees).
De nition 1 (LP-tree). An LP-tree over K is a rooted tree such that
• every vertex v is labeled with good g(v) belonging to K
• every good appears once, and only once, on any path from the root to a leaf
• every non-leaf vertex v has either one outgoing edge labeled by g(v) ∨ g(v), or two outgoing edges labeled by g(v) and g(v), respectively.
Figure 1 provides three examples of LP-trees over
Let L be the set of all possible LP-trees over K. For any vertex v of an LP-tree, let a(v) be the set of goods labeling the ancestors of v, i.e. the vertices on the path from the root to v. For example, in τ 1 described in Figure  1 , if we de ne v as the le most vertex with label o 4 then a(v) = {o 1 , o 3 }. An LP-tree τ represents a preference over bundles in a graphical manner. In order to evaluate a bundle A ⊆ K, we follow the directed path starting from the root, ending at one of the leaf and containing only edges consistent with A, i.e. for each vertex v visited by this directed path, an edge consistent with A would be labeled by either
Note that such a path is unique. Let τ (A) denote such a path. For example, τ 1 ({o 1 , o 2 }) is the path from the root that reaches the rightmost leaf, and τ 3 ({o 2 , o 3 }) is the path that reaches the le most leaf. In order to compare two bundles A and B, with A = B, we consider the rst vertex v in the sequence of vertices visited by both τ (A) and τ (B) and such that g(v) belongs to exactly one of the two bundles. Let τ (A, B) denote such vertex. For example, τ 1 ({o 2 , o 3 }, {o 2 , o 4 }) is the le most vertex labeled by o 3 and with two children in τ 1 , and τ 3 ({o 1 , o 2 , o 3 }, {o 1 , o 3 }) is the rightmost vertex labeled by o 2 and with two children in τ 3 . More formally, τ (A, B) is the unique vertex that is visited by both τ (A) and τ (B) and such that a(τ (A, B)) ⊆ A ⊕ B and g(τ (A, B)) ∈ A ⊕ B, where
Preferences associated with LP-trees are de ned as follows:
De nition 2. For a given LP-tree τ , let τ denote the preference over bundles such that, for any two bundles A, B ⊆ K, A τ B i both g(τ (A, B)) ∈ A and g(τ (A, B)) ∈ B hold.
For example, considering the LP-tree τ 1 of Figure 1 , we have {o 2 , o 3 } τ 1 {o 2 , o 4 } because g(τ 1 ({o 2 , o 3 }, {o 2 , o 4 })) = o 3 and o 3 belongs to {o 2 , o 3 } but not to {o 2 , o 4 }. Note that both τ 1 and τ 3 are not responsive, and τ 2 is lexicographic because τ 2 is a path. In order to simplify notation, we denote by τ the preference such that for any A, B ⊆ K, A τ B i either A τ B or A = B holds.
In the rest of this paper, we assume that agent preferences are conditionally lexicographic and that the preference of each agent is represented by an LP-tree. Using this notation, we dene an exchange problem (e, τ ) by an initial endowment e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ X and a prole τ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) ∈ L n of LP-trees, where τ i denotes the LP-tree that models the preference of agent i. For any i ∈ N and any τ i ∈ L, we denote by (τ i , τ −i ) the preference pro le (τ 1 , . . . , τ i−1 , τ i , τ i+1 , . . . , τ n ). Furthermore, we denote by δ(o) the owner of o in e. Example 1. Consider the set of goods K = {o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 4 }, the set of agents N = {1, 2, 3}, and the initial endowments e such that e 1 = {o 1 , o 4 }, e 2 = {o 2 }, and e 3 = {o 3 }. e LP-trees τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ) presented in Figure 1 describe the conditionally lexicographic preferences of agents 1, 2 and 3, respectively. e pair (e, τ ) de nes an exchange problem.
Exchange Rules and Properties
An exchange rule is a function ϕ : X ×L n → X that maps any exchange problem to an assignment. Let ϕ i (e, τ ) denote the bundle assigned to agent i under assignment ϕ(e, τ ). In this section, we provide the formal de nitions of three properties achievable by an exchange rule, namely individual rationality, Pareto e ciency, and core selection. ese properties have traditionally been considered as desiderata in the literature of social choice and mechanism design.
De nition 3 (Individual Rationality). For a given exchange problem (e, τ ), an assignment x ∈ X is individually rational if x i τ i e i holds for any agent i. An exchange rule ϕ is individually rational (IR) if for any exchange problem (e, τ ), ϕ(e, τ ) is individually rational.
In other words, for each agent, as long as she truthfully reports her preference, she is never worse o by participating in an IR exchange rule. Under such an exchange rule, every agent is incentivized to participate.
De nition 4 (Pareto E ciency). For a given exchange problem (e, τ ), an assignment x ∈ X is Pareto dominated by another y ∈ X if (i) y i τ i x i holds for every i ∈ N , and (ii) y j τ j x j holds for some j ∈ N . An assignment is Pareto e cient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other assignment. An exchange rule ϕ is Pareto e cient (PE) if for any exchange problem (e, τ ), ϕ(e, τ ) is Pareto e cient.
When an assignment x is Pareto dominated by another assignment y, choosing x is suboptimal. erefore, using a PE exchange rule is socially optimal, in the sense that it never chooses such sub-optimal assignment.
De nition 5 (Core Selection). For a given exchange problem (e, τ ), a coalition T ⊆ N of agents blocks an assignment x ∈ X if there exists another assignment y ∈ X such that (i) y i ⊆ ∈T e for every i ∈ T , (ii) y i τ i x i for every i ∈ T , and (iii) y j τ j x j for some j ∈ T . e core C(e, τ ) is the set of assignments that are not blocked by any coalition. An exchange rule ϕ is core-selecting (CS) if for any exchange problem (e, τ ), ϕ(e, τ ) ∈ C(e, τ ) holds.
Condition (i) means that a blocking coalition is restricted to the goods initially owned by the agents in this coalition. Conditions (ii) and (iii) means that, assignment y Pareto dominates x when we only consider the preferences of the agents belonging to the blocking coalition. Intuitively, the existence of a coalition T of agents that blocks an assignment means that they jointly have incentives to form a cartel and get higher utility by leaving behind the set N \ T of all the other agents. When an exchange rule is CS, one can expect that all agents participate without forming any such cartel. In this sense, CS can be regarded as a re nement of IR to any possible coalition of agents. Furthermore, by se ing T = N , the de nition coincides with PE. us, if an exchange rule is CS, it is also PE and IR.
Example 2. Consider the exchange problem of Example 1. Assignment x 1 = ({o 1 , o 4 }, {o 2 }, {o 3 }) = e is obviously individually rational but it is Pareto dominated by x 2 = ({o 1 , o 3 }, {o 2 }, {o 4 }). On the other hand, x 3 = ({o 1 , o 2 }, {o 3 }, {o 4 }) is Pareto e cient but not individually rational, since agent 2 is worse o than his initial endowment. To see that, observe that τ 2 ({o 3 }, {o 2 }) is the unique vertex with label o 2 (see Figure 1) , and g(τ 2 ({o 3 }, {o 2 })) = o 2 belongs to {o 2 } but not to {o 3 }. e assignment x 2 is individually rational and Pareto e cient, but not in the core, because T = {1, 2} ⊂ N is a blocking coalition with the assignment x 4 = ({o 1 , o 2 }, {o 4 }, {o 3 }). Finally x 4 is in the core, and automatically individually rational and Pareto e cient. 
for each o ∈ V t do 9:
end for 11:
for each i ∈ N do Assignment of goods to agents in each cycle of G t
13:
if exists o ∈ V t ∩ e i visited by some cycle C in G t then
14:
Let f denote the successor of o in C Combining the fact that CS property implies both IR and PE properties with the general impossibility result by Sönmez (1999) , or more straightforwardly with the non-existence of an exchange rule that is IR, PE, and strategy-proof under the lexicographic preference domain by Todo et al. (2014) , we can easily conclude that there exists no exchange rule that is CS and strategyproof, even under the conditionally lexicographic preference domain. Our purpose in this paper is therefore to design an exchange rule that is CS and computationally hard to manipulate, while it is inevitably not strategy-proof.
Augmented Top-Trading-Cycles Rule
In this section we propose a new exchange rule, called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC), which is inspired by, and indeed is a natural extension of, the well-known Gale's Top-Trading-Cycle (TTC) procedure. Informally, TTC is a stepwise algorithm simulating a market place, where at each step, the remaining agents point to the most preferred remaining good according to their preferences. e agents which are part of a cycle during a step of the algorithm are assigned to the good they are pointing to and leave the market. ATTC generalizes TTC to exchange problems where agents may have more than one good by dividing each agent into several atomic agents, each of which is assigned exactly one good from the original agents' endowments. en the standard TTC procedure is applied to these atomic agents. Obviously, when each agent is initially endowed with a single good, ATTC results in an assignment identical to the one returned by TTC. In order to apply the TTC procedure to conditionally lexicographic preferences over bundles, we need to know at each step which good is the best to complete the bundle already assigned to one agent. Assume that X t i is the bundle of goods assigned to agent i during the rst t steps, and V t+1 are the remaining goods in the market. e best good to complete X t i , according to the preference of agent i, should be the good o labeling the rst vertex on the path τ i (X t i ) with a label in V t+1 . For example, assume that V t+1 = {o 2 , o 3 , o 4 } and X t 1 = {o 1 }. In that case, the sequence of labels on the path τ 1 ({o 1 }) is (o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 4 ). erefore, o 2 is the best good to complete X t i . To see why, one could compare {o 1 , o 2 } and {o 1 , o 3 , o 4 } according to agent 1 preference τ 1 , and see that {o 1 , o 2 } is preferred to {o 1 , o 3 , o 4 }. e vertex we are referring to i.e., the rst vertex on the path τ i (X t i ) with a label in V t+1 , is the vertex τ i (X t i , X t i ∪ V t+1 ). Algorithm 1 provides a formal description of ATTC.
In the following, we will refer to the graph G t as the ATTC graph during step t. Furthermore, function ϕ will denote the ATTC procedure as described in Algorithm 1. Note that at any step t in the procedure, the ATTC graph G t contains at least one cycle, and such a cycle contains at least one good, from the characterization of the original TTC procedure. erefore it is clear that the running-time of ATTC is polynomial with respect to m, the number of goods.
Example 3. Consider once again the exchange problem presented in Example 1, where δ(o 1 ) = 1, δ(o 2 ) = 2, δ(o 3 ) = 3, and δ(o 4 ) = 1. At the beginning of ATTC, agent 1 is divided into two atomic agents, say 1 and 1 , each of which has the same preference as agent 1, and o 1 and o 4 are the initial endowments of 1 and 1 , respectively. Furthermore, initially X 0 1 = X 0 2 = X 0 3 = ∅. en the original TTC is applied for the market with four atomic agents 1 , 1 , 2 and 3 with initial endowment {o 1 }, {o 4 }, {o 2 } and {o 3 }, respectively. e set V 1 of vertices of the ATTC graph G 1 is {o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 4 }, and the arrows of and (o 2 , o 4 ). e graph G 1 is illustrated in Figure  2 . During step 1, vertex o 1 is the only vertex included in a cycle, and thus the good o 1 is assigned to agent δ(o 1 ) = 1. Furthermore, a er this step W 1 = {o 1 }, X 1 1 = {o 1 } and X 1 2 = X 1 3 = ∅. A er the removal of W 1 , the set of vertices of the ATTC graph G 2 is V 2 = {o 2 , o 3 , o 4 }, and the arrows are (o 2 , o 4 ), (o 3 , o 4 ), and (o 4 , o 2 ). e graph G 2 is illustrated in Figure 3 . During step 2, there is a cycle containing the vertices o 2 and o 4 . erefore, the good o 2 is assigned to agent δ(o 4 ) = 1 and the
A er the removal of W 2 , the set of vertices of the ATTC graph G 3 is V 3 = {o 3 }, and the unique arrow is (o 3 , o 3 ).
e graph G 3 is illustrated in Figure 4 . Finally during step 3, the good o 3 is assigned to agent δ(o 3 ) = 3. Furthermore, a er this step W 3 = {o 3 }, X 3 1 = {o 1 , o 2 }, X 3 2 = {o 4 } and X 3 3 = {o 3 }. A er the removal of W 3 , V 4 = ∅ and the algorithm terminates.
e nal assignment is then x = ({o 1 , o 2 }, {o 4 }, {o 3 }), which is in the core as we observed in Example 1.
Core Selection
We observed, from Example 3, that there is at least one exchange problem for which ATTC returns an assignment in the core. In this section we generalize this observation and show that ATTC inherits the CS property from the original TTC procedure under the conditionally lexicographic preference domain.
In order to introduce this result, we rst show that the comparison of two bundles, A and B, with A = B, through a conditionally lexicographic preference τ only depends on the goods belonging to a(τ (A, B)) ∪ g(τ (A, B)) i.e., the labels of the vertices visited by both path τ (A) and path τ (B) before a aining vertex τ (A, B). Intuitively, we need to show that if C and D are bundles which di er from A and B, respectively, only over the goods outside of a(τ (A, B)) ∪ g(τ (A, B)) then τ (A, B) and τ (C, D) should refer to the same vertex of τ . erefore A τ B i C τ D according to De nition 2.
Proof. By de nition of τ (A, B), we know that for any o ∈ a(τ (A, B)) we have o ∈ A ⇔ o ∈ B, and this implies that
and τ (A, B) is visited by both τ (C) and τ (D).
On the other hand, we know that
is visited by both τ (C) and τ (D), and satis es both a(
Note that during step t of ATTC, all the arrows, from the copies of agent i, are pointing to the same good labeling vertex
is derives a contradiction with the condition (ii) of De nition 5.
We then show that H t 1 holds. Let i ∈ T t . Assume by contradiction that x t i / ∈ y i holds. Property H t 3 implies that g(τ i (x i , y i )) = x t i . erefore x i τ i y i , which is in contradiction with the condition (ii) of De nition 5. Hence x t i ∈ y i . Finally we show that H t 2 holds. Let i ∈ T t and j ∈ N such that x t i ∈ e j . If j / ∈ T , then x t i / ∈ r∈T e r . However, from property H t 1 we know that x t i ∈ y i , which leads to a contradiction with the condition (i) of De nition 5. erefore j ∈ T .
e CS property of ATTC implies that, by utilizing ATTC, it can be checked in polynomial time whether the initial endowment is Pareto e cient under a given pro le of conditionally lexicographic preferences. Indeed, ATTC returns an assignment identical to the initial endowments if and only if it is Pareto e cient since eorem 1 asserts that ATTC returns a PE and IR assignment and an assignment is PE if no other assignment Pareto dominates it. is complements the hardness result related to such a veri cation under the additive preference domain (de Keijzer et al., 2009) , which is a subclass of the responsive preference domain and intersects with the conditionally lexicographic preference domain.
Corollary 1. Under the conditionally lexicographic preference domain, it can be checked in polynomial time, with respect to the number m of goods, whether the initial endowment is Pareto e cient.
Complexity of Finding Bene cial Misreport
In practice, even if an agent is sel sh and hopes to bene t by misreporting, her computation power is limited (Bartholdi et al., 1989) . Under this "bounded rationality" assumption, we expect that an agent will refrain from misreporting, if she needs to solve an NP-hard problem to nd a bene cial manipulation. We show in this section that nding a bene cial preference misreport under ATTC is NP-hard, which gives agents reasonable incentives to report their true preferences.
Note that when we restrict LP-trees to paths, the set of conditionally lexicographic preferences corresponds to the lexicographic preference domain. In order to simplify the following proofs, we rst show that the set of misreport manipulations under consideration can be restricted to lexicographic preferences. To achieve this aim, we show that for any revealed preference τ i by agent i, there exists an LP-tree τ i which is a path and provides the exact same outcome under ATTC.
Proposition 1. For any exchange problem (e, τ ), if agent i reveals τ i instead of τ i , where τ i is the restriction of LP-tree τ i to the path τ i (ϕ i (e, τ )), then ATTC returns the exact same outcome. More formally, ϕ(e, τ ) = ϕ(e, (τ i , τ −i )).
Proof. Let G t = (V t , E t ) (resp. G t = (V t , E t )) denote the ATTC-graph during step t when τ i (resp. τ i = τ i (ϕ i (e, τ ))) is revealed by agent i, and let X t j (resp. Y t j ) denote the set of goods assigned to agent j during the rst t steps of the procedure. We show, by mathematical induction with respect to t, that for any t, G t = G t and X t j = Y t j for any j ∈ N . is property would imply that ϕ(e, τ ) = ϕ(e, (τ i , τ −i )) holds.
Base case (t = 1): At the st step of the procedure, we have V 1 = V 1 = K and the sets of edges, E 1 and E 1 , only depend on the roots of the revealed LP-trees since τ j (∅, K) is the root of τ j for any j ∈ N . For each j ∈ N \ {i}, the revealed LP-trees are exactly the same by de nition.
Furthermore, the good labeling the root of τ i is the same as the good labeling the root of τ i . erefore
for any j ∈ N , we now consider step t of the procedure. From the de nition of Algorithm 1, V t = V t holds and implies that τ j (X
holds for any j ∈ N \ {i}. In other words, this means that the outgoing edge of any good belonging to an agent of N \ {i} is exactly the same in both G t and G t . It remains to show that the outgoing edge of any good o belonging to agent i is the same in both G t and G t .
First of all, we claim that vertex
∪ V t , and this implies that agent i cannot obtain o during ATTC and o ∈ ϕ i (e, τ ), leading to a contradiction.
We claim now that g(τ i (X
do not refer to the same vertex on τ i (ϕ(e, τ )), and assume that τ i (X
and this implies g(τ
i (X t−1 i , X t−1 i ∪ V t )) does not belong to V t . On the other hand, g(τ i (X t−1 i , X t−1 i ∪ V t )) ∈ V t implies that g(τ i (X t−1 i , X t−1 i ∪ V t )) ∈ V t because V t = V t ,
leading to a contradiction. e proof is essentially the same when
Finally, by the de nition of Algorithm 1 we know that the outgoing edge of any good o belonging to agent i is the same in both G t and G t . Hence we have shown that G t and G t are the same, which implies that X t j = Y t j holds for any j ∈ N .
From Proposition 1, the search for a bene cial manipulation can be restricted, without loss of generality, to the lexicographic preference domain. Let P be the subset of L restricted to paths. We formalize the manipulation problem under ATTC as follows:
Instance: exchange problem (e, τ ) and agent i ∈ N .
Note that the size of P is exponentially smaller than the size of L, and thus focusing the search on P is an advantage. However, e following theorem shows that it is still computationally hard even though the search can be restricted. e proof is provided in Appendix B.
Possible Bene t by Preference Misreport
One may nd that the discussion on complexity provided in the previous section only focused on the worst case behavior of ATTC. Actually, even though the optimization problem is NP-hard, an agent might nd the optimal misreport in many cases. In this section we provide an important
observation on this issue; the most preferred an agent originally obtains by truth-telling cannot be improved by any preference misreport.
To be more precise, we introduce some additional notation. Let o * denote the rst good acquired by agent i when she reveals her true preferences τ i . Note that o * is the most preferred good acquired by agent i during ATTC i.e., the singleton containing o * is preferred by agent i to any singleton containing a good acquired by her during ATTC when she reveals τ i . e following proposition shows that o * is also the most preferred good that agent i can obtain under ATTC by misreporting her true preferences. e proof is provided in Appendix D.
Proposition 2. For any exchange problem (e, τ ), any agent i ∈ N and any misreport τ i ∈ P, there is no good o in ϕ i (e, (τ i , τ −i )) which is strictly preferred by agent i to the most preferred good o * of
Proposition 2 provides another evidence that, under ATTC, agents may have a reasonable incentive to report their preferences truthfully. Indeed, under conditionally lexicographic preference domain, an agent mainly cares about the favorite good in her bundle and considers all the other goods as extra. Proposition 2 thus guarantees that agents can bene t only by improving such extra.
Extended Model with Private Endowments
In this section, we consider the situation where each agent can use multiple accounts and the set of her accounts, as well as her initial endowment, is her private information. Each agent can deceive the exchange rule by pretending to be multiple agents under di erent accounts (spli ing accounts, or shortly spli ing). We assume that an agent can declare di erent preferences under different accounts, implying that spli ing is more general than misreporting a preference of a single account. However, to our surprise, it turns out that the sets of possible outcomes by misreporting and spli ing coincide under ATTC.
Another type of possible manipulations by an agent in this situation is to withhold some of her initial endowments (hiding endowments, or shortly hiding), which has already been investigated in the literature of exchange problems (Atlamaz & Klaus, 2007; Todo et al., 2014) . For example, assume that agent i has two laptops A and B. A suits her working style much be er than B, and she also wants a desktop computer C that is owned by another agent j. If i knows that j accepts to trade C with either A or B, i may have an incentive to withhold A and swap B with C. We show that for any hiding manipulation, there exists a preference misreport that results in the same assignment for the manipulator under ATTC.
Splitting Accounts
Let us rst formally de ne spli ing accounts. Under ATTC, we can assume without loss of generality that a manipulator i uses as many accounts as the number of goods in her initial endowment, each of which is endowed with a single good. e reason not to consider spli ing manipulation using less accounts is that, under ATTC, an agent is divided into atomic agents, and therefore the outcome obtained by using less than |e i | accounts can also be obtained by using exactly |e i | accounts.
For an agent i ∈ N with initial endowment e i , a spli ing manipulation s i is described as a pro le of LP-trees (τ o ) o∈e i ∈ P |e i | . Here, each τ o denotes the LP-tree revealed by the account
Algorithm 2 M S Input: exchange problem (e, τ ), manipulator i and spli ing manipulation s i ∈ S(e i ) Output: LP-tree τ i ∈ P providing the same outcome as s i for agent i 1: while Exists o, o ∈ e i visited by the same cycle C in ϕ(e, (s i , τ −i )). do
Let f and o be the goods following o and o in C, respectively.
3:
Let λ and λ be arbitrary LP-trees of P with roots labeled by f and f , respectively.
4:
τ o ← λ 6: end while 7: τ i ← ∅ 8: R ← K 9: while e i ∩ R = ∅ do 10:
Let C be the last cycle visiting a good o of e i in ϕ| R (e, (s i , τ −i )).
11:
Let B denote the set of goods visited by C, and let f be the good following o in C.
12:
R ← R \ B 14: end while 15: Complete τ i arbitrarily by inserting the remaining goods at its tail.
corresponding to the good o of e i . Note that we have restricted the possible manipulations of the di erent accounts to lexicographic preferences P. is is without loss of generality because, according to Proposition 1, any spli ing manipulation using conditionally lexicographic preference can be replaced by a spli ing manipulation using only lexicographic preferences and with the same outcome.
Let S(e i ) denote the set of all possible spli ing manipulations for a given initial endowment e i . Also, for a given exchange problem (e, τ ), an agent i ∈ N , and a spli ing manipulation s i ∈ S(e i ), let ϕ i (e, (s i , τ −i )) denote the bundle assigned to the accounts owned by agent i when she uses the spli ing manipulation s i .
In the following proposition, we clarify the relationship between misreporting and spli ing in the ATTC procedure. Indeed, we show that for any spli ing manipulation, there exists a preference misreport that returns the same assignment to the manipulator. e proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix F.
Proposition 3 (Spli ing → Misreport). For any exchange problem (e, τ ), any manipulator i ∈ N , and any spli ing manipulation s i ∈ S(e i ), Algorithm 2 returns a misreport τ i ∈ P such that
By abuse of notation, in Algorithm 2 we denote by ϕ(e, (s i , τ −i )) the ATTC procedure applied to the exchange problem (e, (s i , τ −i )) i.e., not only the outcome of this procedure, but also the di erent steps to obtain this outcome. In the same vein, we denote by ϕ| R (e, (s i , τ −i )) the ATTC procedure applied to the exchange problem restricted to the goods of R (any agent without good in the restricted problem is removed). Note that, during ATTC, it may be the case that multiple accounts of the manipulator are involved in the same cycle. e rst while loop of Algorithm 2 provides a spli ing manipulation, under which agent i obtains exactly the same bundle and no two goods in e i are involved in the same cycle during ATTC. is part is convenient to ease the proof. e second while loop constructs an LP-tree τ i by adding one by one the goods (more precisely the vertices labeled by the goods) according to their appearance during the ATTC procedure. e construction of τ i relies on the procedure add add, which adds a new vertex labeled by a given good o on top of τ i . e two main ideas behind Algorithm 2 are the following: (i) if an account of agent i trades its good o for good o during ATTC, then changing its preference by pu ing o on top does not change the outcome because the account owns only o, and (ii) if an account of agent i is not able to acquire a good o (even by misreporting) then changing its preference by pu ing o at the bo om does not change the outcome.
One can consider the decision problem of checking if a bene cial spli ing manipulation exists. e de nition of this problem, called B S , is similar to De nition 6 except that the set of available manipulations is the set of spli ing manipulations S(e i ) instead of P. Proposition 3 implies that, while spli ing accounts provides much richer manipulations than misreporting preferences (and actually any misreport can be obviously represented as a spli ing), the spaces of the possible outcomes by spli ing and misreporting coincide. From this observation, combined with the fact that Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. B S is NP-complete.
Hiding Endowments
We then turn to consider manipulations by hiding endowments. A hiding manipulation h i , operated by a manipulating agent i with initial endowment e i , is represented by a triple (e r i , e w i , τ i ) such that e r i ∪ e w i = e i , e r i ∩ e w i = ∅, and τ i ∈ P. e rst two components e r i and e w i indicate the set of goods revealed to ATTC and the set of goods withheld by agent i, respectively. e third component τ i indicates the preference reported by agent i. Recall that the set of preference revealed can be restricted to lexicographic preferences without loss of generality.
Let H(e i ) denote the set of all possible hiding manipulations by an agent i who initially owns an endowment e i . Given exchange problem (e, τ ), agent i ∈ N , and hiding manipula-
) denote the bundle assigned to agent i under ATTC when she operates hiding manipulation h i . Note that since the manipulator is withholding e w i , she nally obtains ϕ i (e, (h i , τ −i ))∪e w i . e following proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 3 for hiding manipulation.
Proposition 4 (Hiding → Spli ing). For any exchange problem (e, τ ), any manipulator i ∈ N , and any hiding manipulation h i ∈ H(e i ), Algorithm 3 returns a spli ing manipulation s i such that
i . e proof of this proposition is in Appendix E. Algorithm 3 creates a spli ing manipulation by constructing the LP-trees of the di erent accounts belonging to the manipulator one by one. If a good was hidden then the corresponding account prefers its good to the others. If a good was not hidden then the corresponding account has the same preference as the one used in the hiding manipulation.
One can consider the decision problem of checking if a bene cial hiding manipulation exists. e de nition of this problem, called B H , is similar to De nition 6 except that the set of available manipulations is the set of hiding manipulations H(e i ) instead of P. Note that hiding is another generalization of misreporting preference because the manipulator is able to misreport her preferences in addition to hide her endowment. erefore, combining Proposition 4 Let λ be an arbitrary LP-tree of P with root labeled by o.
4:
τ o ← λ 5:
end if 8: end for 9:
with Proposition 3, we can see that the space of possible outcomes by hiding also coincides with the one by misreporting. erefore, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. B H is NP-complete.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the exchange problem where each agent initially has a set of indivisible goods and a conditionally lexicographic preference. We proposed the ATTC rule, which is core-selecting and runs in polynomial-time. e ATTC rule may also be used to verify, in polynomial time, if the initial endowment is Pareto e cient. Concerning agents' incentives, we showed that nding a bene cial misreport under ATTC is NP-complete, while it is inevitably not strategyproof due to Sönmez's nding. We also showed that the NP-completeness of nding a bene cial manipulation can be extended to the case where the ownerships of endowments are private, so that each agent can use spli ing/hiding manipulations. A future direction for this work would be to characterize the ATTC rule. Since the core assignment is not always unique in our model with multiple endowments, there might be a di erent exchange rule that is also core-selecting and runs in polynomial time. For such a characterization, we must discover unique properties of ATTC. Another possible extension would be to consider a larger set of preferences than conditionally lexicographic preferences. CP-nets (Boutilier, Brafman, Domshlak, Hoos, & Poole, 2004 ) may be used to compactly represent preferences over bundle of goods, including ones containing indi erences between bundles. Actually, LP-trees are a subclass of CP-nets. Contrary to LP-trees, CP-nets can represent any type of preferences over bundles of goods. It would be interesting to de ne a subclass of CP-nets, larger than LP-trees, where the ATTC algorithm can be extended to provide an assignment in the core.
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Appendix A. Structure of Appendix
In this appendix we provide several technical materials, including some proofs omi ed in the main part of the paper. is appendix is organized as follows: Appendix B provides the proof of NP-completeness of B M . Appendix C provides several lemmas related to ATTC, which are useful for proving other technical materials. Appendix D contains some lemmas used to compare the behavior of ATTC for two di erent pro les of preferences, and the proof of Proposition 2. Appendix E provides the proof of Proposition 4. Finally, Appendix F provides the proof of Proposition 3.
Appendix B. Omitted Proof for Section 6
e reduction is from the following NP-complete problem (Gold, 1978) :
Instance: set U of variables, collection C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } of m clauses over U such that each clause c j has three literals, denoted c 1 j , c 2 j and c 3 j , which are either only negated variables or only un-negated variables.
estion: is there a truth assignment of the variables satisfying all clauses.
We can assume without loss of generality that clause indices are such that all clauses containing only un-negated variable precede clauses containing only negated variables.
Proof. B M is clearly in NP since ATTC runs in polynomial time. e reduction from an instance of M3SAT is as follows. For each clause c i , we create 3 goods κ i , ξ i and ξ i . Furthermore, for any literal c i , we create a good χ i . To these 9m goods, we add two goods µ and µ . Other goods will be introduced later on, but for sake of simplicity we focus rst on this subset of goods.
e initial endowment of the manipulator is composed by the goods χ i for any i and , as well as good µ. e true preference of the manipulator is
. . . e manipulator will be the only agent owning more than one good. For sake of simplicity, we identify other agents by their goods. Figure 5 describes the preferences of these agents. Solidline edge denotes the most preferred good, dash-line edge the second most preferred good, and doted-line edge either the third or fourth most preferred good. Furthermore, the doted-circles are missing goods that will be presented later on. For the time being, we can assume that inner edges and outer edges of these doted-circles are directly connected.
We are now able to present the main idea of the reduction. When the manipulator reveals his true preferences, he obtains his favorite goods except for µ . Indeed, during ATTC he rst exchanges µ with κ 1 , and then χ 1 1 with ξ 1 , χ 2 1 with ξ 1 , χ 3 1 with κ 2 , and so on. At the end, the manipulator is not able to obtain µ since he has already exchanged µ with another good. erefore, he keeps his good χ 3 m . Note that the only way for him to be be er of is to obtain his most preferred goods i.e., µ instead of χ 3 m . But to obtain such assignment, he must exchange
where for each clause c i ,
. e good χ i exchanged with κ i will correspond to the literal rendering true clause c i . We are now ready to introduce the remaining goods. e aim of the goods occulted in Figure 5 is to maintain consistency on the choice of literals rendering true clauses. In other words, we want to avoid a situation where two goods χ i and χ k j , corresponding to a variable and its negation, are exchanged by the manipulator in order to obtain goods κ i and κ j . To do so, for any pair of literals c i and c k j , such that c i is u and c k j is ¬u for some variable u ∈ U , we introduce goods α Figure 6 . In this gure, the most preferred (resp. second most preferred) good for the owner of α i,
j,k ) is one of the goods introduced because literal c k j (resp. c i ) is ¬u (resp. u) and c j (resp. c i ) is the latest clause preceding c j (resp. c k ) that contains ¬u (resp. u) as one of its literals. If c j (resp. c i ) is the rst clause containing ¬u (resp. u) as one of its literals, then the most preferred (resp. second most preferred) good for the owner of α i, j,k (resp. γ i, j,k ) is χ i (resp. χ k j ). Finally, the outgoing edge of κ i (resp. κ j ), which partially appears in Figure 5 , is directed toward the ( + 1) th most preferred good (resp. (k + 1) th most preferred good) for the owner of κ i (resp. κ j ). is good is denoted in Figure 5 by α i,
is one of the good introduced because literal c k j (resp. c i ) is ¬u (resp. u) and c j (resp. c i ) is the last clause that contains ¬u (resp. u) as one of its literals.
To see how this gadget works, assume that the manipulator exchanges χ i to obtain κ i , corresponding to the case where c i is true because of literal c i (i.e. positive occurrence of variable u).
is exchange involves a cycle in the ATTC-graph including the goods on the unique path from κ i to χ i . is path includes good α i, j,k which is exchanged. e owner of β i, j,k does not belong to this path, and therefore he keeps his good. Furthermore, the most preferred remaining good for him a er this exchange becomes γ i, j,k . Since β i, j,k is the most preferred good for the owner of γ i, j,k , the exchange between these two goods is performed at the next step of ATTC. A er this exchange performed, the unique possible path from κ j to χ k j is broken and the manipulator cannot use anymore χ k j to obtain κ j . On the other hand, assume now that the manipulator wants to use χ k j to obtain κ j , corresponding to the case where c j is true because of literal c k j (i.e. negative occurrence of variable u). For this exchange to be possible, it is required for good β i, j,k to be exchanged with another good To conclude the proof, we show that there is a truth assignment satisfying all clauses in the M3SAT instance i there is a bene cial manipulation where the manipulator receives his 3m + 1 most preferred goods. If there is truth assignment Υ satisfying all clauses in the M3SAT instance then we construct a bene cial manipulation step by step as follows. Good µ will be at the top of the preference revealed by the manipulator. us, the rst exchange performed during ATTC will be between µ and µ . A er this exchange performed, the most preferred remaining good for the owner of κ 1 changes and a path from κ 1 to χ 1 1 appears in the ATTC-graph. If literal c 1 1 is true according to Υ then the second good in the preference revealed by the manipulator is κ 1 , and the third and fourth goods are ξ 1 and ξ 1 , respectively. In that case, κ 1 being the most preferred remaining good according to the preference revealed by the manipulator, there is a cycle including χ 1 1 and the manipulator obtains κ 1 in exchange of χ 1 1 . A erward, χ 2 1 and χ 3 1 are exchanged with ξ 1 and ξ 1 , respectively. Note that in that case, each good α erefore, the second most preferred good for the owner of κ 1 is removed from the ATTC-graph, and there is a path from κ 1 to χ 2 1 . In that case, if c 2 1 is true according to Υ then the third and fourth goods in the preference revealed by the manipulator are κ 1 and ξ 1 , and both goods are obtained by the manipulator. On the other hand, if literal c 2 1 is not true according to Υ then literal c 3 1 is true and the third and fourth goods in the preference revealed by the manipulator are ξ 1 and κ 1 . We continue in a similar fashion to construct the rest of the preference pro le revealed by the manipulator, and it is easy to check that at the end he obtains his 3m + 1 most preferred goods.
Assume now that there is a bene cial manipulation where the manipulator receives his 3m+1 most preferred goods. Note rst that µ must be exchanged with µ . Furthermore, for any clause c i there must be two goods χ i and χ i exchanged with goods ξ i and ξ i , because otherwise one of this good will not be obtained by the manipulator. erefore, the remaining good, say χ i , will be the only one available to obtain good κ j for a clause c j possibly di erent to c i . If c i is a clause F , L , S , T , & Y containing un-negated variable then χ i must be exchanged to obtain κ i because otherwise the manipulator will not be able to obtain κ i , leading to a contradiction. Indeed, assume by contradiction that another good, say χ k j is used by the manipulator to obtain κ i . By construction, literal c k j must be a negated occurrence of c i , because otherwise no path from κ i to χ k j are possible in the ATTC-graph. But on the other hand, the path from κ i to χ k j passes through goods α i, j,k and β i, j,k . erefore, both goods must be part of the remaining goods in the ATTC-graph. Since α i, j,k is the most preferred good according to the preference of the owner of β i, j,k , the path should stop with a cycle including α i, j,k and β i, j,k , leading to a contradiction. Finally, if c i is a clause containing negated variable then χ i must also be exchanged to obtain κ i because there is no possible path in the ATTC-graph from κ i to a good χ k j corresponding to a negated variable. All in all, for each clause c i , there is one good χ i which is used to obtain κ i . Furthermore, by construction we know that no pair of goods χ i and χ k j , corresponding to a variable and its negation, are exchanged by the manipulator in order to obtain goods κ i and κ j .
erefore, one can easily construct a truth assignment of the variables in U such that each literal c i , corresponding to a good χ i exchanged with κ i , is true. Such assignment satis es all clauses of C and this concludes the proof.
Appendix C. Basic Properties of ATTC
We compile in this appendix all the basic lemmas which will be of help to prove more elaborate results. We start by providing notations which will be used in all appendices. Consider an assignment problem (e, τ ) involving a set of agents or identities N . In this appendix we do not make any hypothesis on the existence of manipulators using multiple identities. ese manipulators may or may not exist and all the revealed identities are considered as agents belonging to N . Furthermore, the revealed preference pro le τ may or may not contain misreport, and this preference pro le, as well as the initial endowment e, are just part of the input of the ATTC procedure.
Let G k = (V k , E k ) be the ATTC graph during the step k of ATTC applied to (e, τ ), and let X k i be the set of goods assigned to agent i a er the k rst steps. Note that for any step k and for any good o belonging to V k , there exists a unique directed path in G k which starts from o and visits various goods of V k before cycling to one of the goods already visited. Let p k (o) denote this directed path in G k , and let S k (o) be the set of goods visited by p k (o). Figure 7a illustrates with solid-line edges such path p k (o 1 ) which could appear in G k . In this example, the set of goods Figure 7a represents edges of E k which are not part of p k (o 1 ). Figure 7b illustrates with solid-line edges directed path p k (o 4 ) in G k , which starts from good o 4 . Note that for any step k of the ATTC procedure and for any good o belonging to V k , the directed path p k (o) is unique because the outdegree of any vertex in G k is equal to 1.
It can be seen that the directed path p k (o 4 ) is a subpath of p k (o 1 ) (see Figure 7 ). More generally, for any good o belonging to S k (o), the directed path
) and p k (o 7 ) correspond to the same cycle as p k (o 4 ), and e following lemma states that if the most preferred remaining good for agent i in G k and G k+1 are the same then no good can be assigned to agent i during step k.
Lemma 3. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1, for any good o belonging to V k and for any good f such that
. Proof. Note rst that f ∈ V k+1 implies that no cycle including f belongs to G k . Furthermore, by de nition of Algorithm 1 we know that for any good o belonging to e δ(o) ∩V k , (o , f ) is the unique outgoing edge from o in G k . erefore, o cannot be visited by a cycle in G k because otherwise f would be also visited by that cycle. us, no good belonging to agent δ(o) is exchanged during step k, and
holds.
e following lemma shows that if a good labels an ancestor of the current vertex of τ i under consideration during step k then it will also be the case during ulterior steps.
Lemma 4. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 and for any agent i ∈ N , the following inclusion holds:
) have in common the subpath from the root to τ i (X
Corollary 4. For any steps t and r of Algorithm 1 such that r ≥ t and for any agent i ∈ N , the following inclusion holds: a(τ i (X
).
e following lemma shows that during any step k, any ancestor of
∪ V k ) which is not assigned to agent i would be preferred by her to any goods of V k . 
e following lemma shows that if the most preferred remaining good in V k for an agent is not exchanged during step k then it remains her most preferred good in V k+1 for her.
Lemma 6. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 and for any edge
e result of Lemma 6 can be extended from a simple edge into a directed path of the ATTC graph. For example, Figure 8 illustrates the ATTC graph during two successive steps. e goods of B = {o 5 , o 6 , o 7 } belong to a cycle during step k − 1, as illustrated in Figure 8a . Hence, the goods of B vanish from G k ,as illustrated in Figure 8b . Figure 8 illustrates that the goods of S k−1 (o 1 ) belong also to S k (o 1 ), except for the ones of B which are not in V k . Furthermore, the sequence of goods visited by p k−1 (o) before reaching the rst good of B remains the same in p k (o). e following lemma formalizes these observations. Lemma 7. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 and any good o ∈ V k , we have
Proof. Note rst that the outgoing edge of the last good visited by p k−1 (o) is pointing to a good of S k−1 (o). is outgoing edge creates a cycle in p k−1 (o). Let B be the subset of S k−1 (o) visited by this cycle. By de nition of Algorithm 1, we have B ∩ V k = ∅ and 
Since o and f belong to V k , we know by Lemma 6 that
So we have proved that all the edges of subpath [p k−1 (o)] o belong to G k . erefore this directed path exists also in G k , and all the goods of S k−1 (o) ∩ V k are visited by this path. Furthermore, this path is a subpath of p k (o) since the outdegree of any good in G k equals 1. Hence,
is trivially implies that for any good f belonging to
Corollary 5. For any pair (k, l) of steps of Algorithm 1 such that k ≥ l, and for any good o ∈ V k , we have
e following lemma states that if p k−1 (o) visits at least one good of subset B ⊆ V k−1 during step k − 1, and if both o and all the goods of B are part of G k , then p k (o) should visit at least one good of B during step k.
Lemma 8. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1, for any good o ∈ V k and for any subset
Corollary 6. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1, for any good o ∈ V k and for any subset
Appendix D. Relationship of ATTC Outcomes for Two Di erent Pro les and
Omitted Proof for Section 7
In this appendix, we study the parallel evolution of the ATTC graphs when two di erent preference pro les τ and τ are revealed by the same set of agents or identities N . Note rst that the lemmas of Annexe C can be applied both when τ or τ are revealed. Let I be the subset of agents or identities of N who do not reveal the same LP-trees in τ and τ . We denote by (resp. τ ) is revealed, and let Y k i (resp. X k i ) denote the set of goods assigned to agent i a er the k rst steps in that case. Let p k (o) (resp. p k (o)) denote the directed path in G k (resp. G k ) which starts from good o, and let S k (o) (resp. S k (o)) denote the set of goods visited by
) denote the subpath of p k (o) (resp. p k (o)) which starts from good o and nishes at good o (resp. o ).
We start by focusing on the similarities in both cases. One could conjecture that if path p r (o) never visits one of the goods belonging to an agent of I for any step r = 1, . . . , k then path p r (o) and path p r (o) should be the same (i.e., visits the same sequence of vertices) for any step r = 1, . . . , k.
is conjecture seems realistic since the owners of the goods belonging to these paths did not change their preferences. But in reality, this conjecture may be false if the owner of one of the goods visited by p k (o) prefers good o belonging to an agent of I to all remaining goods in V k , and o does not belong to V k but belongs to V k . However, the following lemma shows that this conjecture is true under the condition that all goods belonging to the agents of I are still part of the ATTC graph.
Lemma 9. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 such that i∈I e i ⊆ V k (i.e., no good of an agent belonging to I has been assigned), and for any good o ∈ V k , if S k (o)∩ i∈I e i = ∅ (i.e., no good of an agent belonging to I has been visited by path
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on the number of steps k.
Base case: V 1 = V 1 trivially holds since both sets equal K. Let o be a good of V 1 such that S 1 (o) ∩ i∈I e i = ∅. For any good o ∈ S 1 (o) and for any good f such that (o , f ) ∈ E 1 , we know by de nition of Algorithm 1 that f labels the root of τ δ(o ) . On the other hand, τ δ(o ) and τ δ(o ) are the same since o ∈ i∈I e i implies δ(o ) ∈ I. erefore, the root of τ δ(o ) is also labeled by f , and by de nition of Algorithm 1 we have (o , f ) ∈ E 1 . e outdegree of any vertex of V 1 being equal to 1, we obtain p 1 (o) = p 1 (o).
Let f denote the good labeling the root of τ δ(o) . By de nition of Algorithm 1, edge (o, f ) belongs to E 1 . is implies that S 1 (f ) is a subset of S 1 (o), and therefore S 1 (f ) ∩ i∈I e i = ∅ holds. As it was shown above, this implies that p 1 (f ) = p 1 (f ) holds. Furthermore, by de nition of Algorithm 1 we know that for any good o ∈ e δ(o) , the unique outgoing edge of o in V 1 is (o , f ). Hence, if a good belonging to e δ(o) is part of a cycle in G 1 then this cycle should be p 1 (f ).
erefore, this cycle should appear also in G 1 under the form of p 1 (p). On the other hand, if there is no cycle in G 1 including a good of e δ(o) then S 1 (f ) ∩ e δ(o) = ∅ should hold.
erefore, this implies with p 1 (f ) = p 1 (f ) that S 1 (f ) ∩ e δ(o) = ∅ holds and no good of e δ(o) is visited by a cycle in G 1 . So we have proved that X 1 δ(o) = Y 1 δ(o) . Induction step: Let k be a step of Algorithm 1 such that i∈I e i ⊆ V k , and let o ∈ V k such that S k (o) ∩ i∈I e i = ∅. Corollary 6 implies that S k−1 (o) ∩ i∈I e i = ∅ holds. erefore, by induction hypothesis we know that
But this cycle appears also in G k−1 under the form p k−1 (o). erefore o should not belong to V k , leading to a contradiction. Now, we show by contradiction that
and let f be the rst good visited by p k (o) which di ers from p k (o), and let f be the good visited by p k (o) instead of f . Let o be the good preceding both f in p k (o) and f in p k (o), and let Figure 9 : Di erences between a path in G k an G k the owner of o . Figure 9 illustrates the notations. Note that we do not presume the presence or absence of f and f in V k and V k , respectively. Lemma 2 implies that a(τ j (X
On the other hand, this implies that at least one good o ∈ i∈I e i is included in the cycle p l (f ), and o ∈ V l+1 . But this also leads to a contradiction with i∈I e i ⊆ V k since V k ⊆ V l+1 . erefore, we have proved that (ii) f ∈ V k does not hold. To summarize, we have proved that both (i) and (ii) do not hold, leading to a contradiction.
erefore we have proved
Finally, following the same logic as in the base case, it is easy to prove that the same good is assigned to δ(o) during step k in both G k and G k . Furthermore by induction hypothesis we know that X
e following lemma extends in a sense Lemma 9 to the rst step of Algorithm 1 where path p k (o) reaches a good belonging to an agent of I.
Lemma 10. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 such that i∈I e i ⊆ V k , and for any good o ∈ V k , if k is the rst step such that S k (o) ∩ i∈I e i = ∅, and if f is the rst good of i∈I e i visited by
e proof of this lemma is similar to the induction proof of Lemma 9. Indeed, the proof of Lemma 10 can be obtained by replacing the edges and goods visited by p k (o) and p k (o) by the edges and goods visited by
f o , respectively. Furthermore, the proof of this lemma does not need to be made by induction because the induction hypothesis used in the proof of Lemma 9 is replaced by the application of Lemma 9 to step k − 1, where p k−1 (o) does not reach a good of i∈I e i . erefore, the proof of this lemma is omi ed.
Finally, the end of this appendix is dedicated to the proof of Proposition 2. We assume here that τ is the true preference pro le and τ is the preference pro le revealed when agent i tries to manipulate. Agent i is the only agent who changes her preference from τ to τ , and therefore I = {i}. Let o * denote the rst good acquired by agent i when she reveals her true preference τ i .
e following proposition is a reformulation of Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. For any good o ∈ ϕ i (e, τ ), {o * } τ i {o} holds.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there exists o ∈ ϕ i (e, τ ) such that {o} τ i {o * }. By definition of τ i , this means that g(τ i ({o * }, {o})) = o and o = o * . Let k denote the step of Algorithm 1 where o * is assigned to agent i when she reveals τ i . By de nition of 1, this implies that g(τ i (X
Now, o ∈ V k means that there is a step l < k where p l (o) forms a cycle including o in G l . But on the other hand, e i ⊆ V k implies that no good belonging to agent i should be contained in a cycle in G l , and S l (o) ∩ e i = ∅ holds. is implies by Lemma 9 that o ∈ V l and p
hold. Hence, good o is assigned to the same agent in G l and G l , and this agent is not agent i since S l (o) ∩ e i = ∅. is leads to a contradiction with o assigned to agent i when she reveals τ i .
Appendix E. Omitted Proof for Subsection 8.2
In this appendix we study the impact of removing set B of goods from the initial endowment in an assignment problem. e removal of these goods may be due to hiding manipulation or for the requirement of some proofs. Furthermore, the goods of B may belong to the initial endowment of a single agent or multiples agents. e results provided in this appendix applies in all these cases. We assume in this appendix that, from an assignment problem (e, τ ), we are able to construct a truncated assignment problem (e , τ ) on the same set of agents or identities N and with the same preference pro le τ , but where the initial endowment e results from the removal of the goods of B from e . We denote by
the ATTC graph during step k of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) (resp. (e, τ )), and let Y k i (resp. X k i ) denote the set of goods assigned to agent i a er the k rst steps in that case. Let p k (o) (resp. p k (o)) denote the directed path in G k (resp. G k ) which starts from good o, and let S k (o) (resp. S k (o)) denote the set of goods visited by p k (o) (resp. p k (o)).
Note that the de nition of e may lead to an empty endowment for some agents of N . However, in that case these agents are ignored during Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ), and no good is assigned to them. Note also that the LP-trees of τ contain vertices labeled by the goods of B. erefore, in order to compare sets of goods through these LP-trees, we initially assign the goods of B to the agents who receive them during Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ). More formally, we assume that Y 0 i , which is the set of goods assigned to agent i before the rst step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ), contains the subset of goods of B assigned to agent i during Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) i.e., we have Y 0 i = ϕ i (e, τ ) ∩ B for any agent i ∈ N . Hence, by de nition of Algorithm 1 we have
for any step k ≥ 1 and for any agent i ∈ N . However, the goods of Y 0 i are not really assigned to agent i during Algorithm 1 because no agent reveals these goods as part of her initial endowment in e . e following lemma is similar to Lemma 9, but applied to the context of changes in the initial endowment rather than changes in the revealed preference pro le.
Lemma 11. For any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 such that B ⊆ V k , and for any good o ∈ V k , if
hold. e proof of this Lemma is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 9. erefore, we chose to omit the proof of this lemma.
e following lemma shows that if we remove the goods visited by a cycle appearing during Algorithm 1 then the sequence of cycles occurring during prior steps is not a ected by this removal.
Lemma 12. If B corresponds to the set of goods visited by a cycle C occuring in G k then any cycle C = C, occuring in G l during step l ≤ k, appears also in G l . Furthermore, for any good o visited by
Proof. Let o be a good visited by cycle C = C during step l ≤ k. We know that C occurs during step k and visits all the goods of B. erefore,
, and we have established the rst part of the lemma. As argued above, the sequences of cycles occurring in Algorithm 1 applied to both (e, τ ) and (e , τ ) are the same during the k rst steps (except for C during step k). erefore, for any step
Let o be a good visited by cycle C = C during step l ≤ k. We know by Lemma 11 that Y l−1
Hence, by Lemma 1 we can assert that
Lemma 12 can be applied to remove the goods visited by a cycle occurring during the last step of Algorithm 1 without changing the outcome. We will use Lemma 12 to show that we can also remove the goods visited by a cycle occurring during an arbitrary step of Algorithm 1 without changing the outcome. e sketch of proof for a given cycle C occurring during step k is as follow:
• Remove one by one the cycles occurring during the last step of Algorithm 1 until k becomes the last step of Algorithm 1 applied to the truncated problem (ẽ, τ ), whereẽ is the initial endowment resulting a er removal,
• Remove from (ẽ, τ ) the goods visited by C to obtain assignment problem (e , τ ),
• Put back one by one the goods of the cycles removed in the rst bullet until all goods, except for those removed in the second bullet, are back.
We will show that all these transformations preserve the outcome of Algorithm 1 for the remaining goods. Lemma 12 can be used to show that the outcome of Algorithm 1 is preserved by the transformations of the rst and second bullets. But in the third bullet, we insert goods instead of removing them. erefore, we need to show that, under some conditions, we can add some goods in an assignment problem without changing the outcome of Algorithm 1 for the goods which were already part of the problem. To be as close as possible to the notations used in the sketch of proof, we assume here that the assignment problem (e , τ ) results from the assignment problem (e , τ ) by adding the goods of a given set D i.e., each good o of D is reassigned to the initial endowment e δ(o) of its owner δ(o) in the original problem (e, τ ) (where o ∈ e δ(o) ). We denote by G k = (V k , E k ) the ATTC graph during step k of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ), and let Z k i denote the set of goods assigned to agent i a er the k rst steps in that case. Let p k (o) denote the directed path in G k which starts from good o, and let S k (o) denote the set of goods visited by p k (o).
Note that during the transformations of the rst and second bullets, removed goods were assigned to agents before the beginning of the ATTC procedure applied to (e , τ ). We assume that we keep this initial assignment in (e , τ ) except for the goods of D which are reinjected into the
problem. More formally, we assume that for any agent i ∈ N , Y 0 i = Z 0 i \ D, where Y 0 i are the goods assigned before the rst step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ). e following lemma shows that if for any agent the goods of D are less worthy than the goods assigned to them by Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) then the outcome of Algorithm 1 is exactly the same for the goods in common to e and e .
Lemma 13. If for any step k ≥ 1 of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ), and for any agent i such that
holds for any step l. Furthermore, with the same conditions, for any cycle C in G l and for any good o visited by C , C occurs also in G l and
Proof. By contradiction let l be the rst step of Algorithm 1 such that V l = V l \ D or E l ⊆ E l hold. is means that during any ulterior step r < l, V r = V r \ D and E r ⊆ E r hold. is implies that for any good o ∈ V r , p r (o) = p r (o) because S r (o) ⊆ V r holds and every outgoing edges of the goods of S r (o) are the same in G l and G l . erefore, V l = V l \ D has to hold, and this implies by assumption that E l ⊆ E l holds. Furthermore, any good of V r \ V r+1 , assigned during step r < l of the Algorithm 1 procedure applied to (e , τ ), should be assigned to the same agent during step r of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ). erefore,
Let o be a good of V l such that the outgoing edge from o in E l does not belong to E l , and let i = δ(o) be the owner of o. By de nition of Algorithm 1, this means that
, leading to a contradiction. Hence, both V l = V l \ D and E l ⊆ E l hold and the rst part of Lemma 13 is established.
Let C be a cycle occurring in G l and let o be a good visited by C . According to the rst part of Lemma 13, we know that V l ⊆ V l and E l ⊆ E l . erefore, the outgoing edge of any good in S l (o) ⊆ V l is the same in G l and G l , and C = p l (o) = p l (o) holds. In other words, cycle C occurs also in G l under the form p k (o). Furthermore, by following the same reasoning as in the previous paragraph, it is easy to show that
We are now ready to prove that the removal of B, the set of goods visited by a cycle C, does not change the outcome of Algorithm 1 for the remaining goods. In the following lemma, we assume that (e, τ ) is the initial problem and (e , τ ) is the problem resulting from the removal of B from (e, τ ). We assume also that C occurs during step k of the Algorithm 1 procedure applied to (e, τ ).
Lemma 14. If C = C is a cycle occurring in G l during step l of Algorithm 1 then C occurs also in G r during a step r ≤ l. Furthermore, if C = C is another cycle appearing in G s during a step s < l, and both C and C visit goods belonging to the initial endowment of a given agent then C occurs in G t during a step t < r.
e rst part of the Lemma 14 states that a cycle occurring in Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) occurs also in the Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ), and this cycle does not occur later during Algorithm 1 for (e , τ ) than (e, τ ).
e second part of Lemma 14 states that the sequence of cycles
involving the goods of an agent is the same for Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) or (e , τ ), even if cycles may occurs earlier when Algorithm 1 is applied to the truncated problem (e , τ ). We follow the sketch of proof presented earlier and its notations.
Proof. In addition to Lemma 14, we show that for any cycle C = C occurring in G l and occurring in G r during step r ≤ l (as in the statement of Lemma 14) and for any good o visited by C ,
holds. Let h denotes the last step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ). e proof is by induction on h − k.
Base case: When h = k i.e., k is the last step of Algorithm 1, Lemma 12 states that we can remove the goods of B without changing the behavior of Algorithm 1 for the remaining goods. Hence, any cycle C = C occurring in G l occurs also in G l . Furthermore, for the same reason if C = C is another cycle appearing in G s during a step s < l then C appears in G s , and s < l. Finally, Lemma 12 states that for any good o visited by
Induction step: Assume now that h > k. Let (ẽ, τ ) be the assignment problem obtained by removing the goods of V h i.e., the goods assigned during the last step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ). We denote byG l = (Ṽ l ,Ẽ l ) the ATTC graph during step l of the ATTC procedure applied to (ẽ, τ ), andZ i l the set of goods assigned to agent i at the end of this step. For any agent i ∈ N , the set of goodsZ i 0 is the set of goods assigned to agent i before the beginning of Algorithm 1 applied to (ẽ, τ ), and it contains the good of V h assigned to agent i during the last step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ), if such a good exists. Note thatZ i 0 contains at most one good since at most one good can be assigned to an agent during one step of Algorithm 1.
By assuming that the goods of V h were removed cycle by cycle, we can state by Lemma 12 that any cycle C occurring in G l during step l < h occurs also inG l , and for any good o visited by C , we have
Hence, Algorithm 1 applied to (ẽ, τ ) has exactly h − 1 steps. Now let (e , τ ) be the assignment problem obtained by removing the goods of B to the assignment problem (ẽ, τ ).
e notations used to describe the di erent steps of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) are the same than the ones described before Lemma 13. Note that for any agent i ∈ N , the set of goods Z i 0 contains the good ofZ i 0 and the goods of B assigned to agent i during Algorithm 1 applied to (ẽ, τ ), if such good exists. By induction hypothesis we know that any cycle C = C, occurring inG l (and equivalently in G l ) occurs also in G r during a step r ≤ l. Furthermore, if C = C is another cycle appearing inG s during a step s < l (and equivalently in G s ), and both C and C visit goods belonging to the initial endowment of a given agent, then C appears in G t during a step t < r. Finally, for any good
We show now that for any step t of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) and for any agent i such that
By contradiction let t be the rst step where there is an agent i with e i ∩ V t = ∅ and a(τ i (Z
Let r ≥ t be the earliest step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) such that a good o belonging to e i (i.e., δ(o) = i) is visited by a cycle C in G r . By Corollary 4 we know that a(τ i (Z we know that there exists a step l ≥ r such that C occurs inG l (and equivalently in G l ), and
Note rst that assignment problem (e , τ ) can be obtained from (e , τ ) by reinserting the goods of V h into the initial endowment of their owners (instead of assigning these goods to their owner before starting Algorithm 1). Notations used to describe Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) are the same than the ones used at the beginning of this appendix.
e property shown in the previous paragraph implies that we can apply Lemma 13. Hence, V r = V r \ V h and E r ⊆ E r hold for any step r, any cycle C occurring in G r will occur also in G r , and for any good o visited by C ,
holds. Furthermore, we we have shown earlier that C also occurs inG l (and equivalently in G l ) during a step l ≥ r, and
To summarize, for any cycle C = C occuring in G l during a step l < h, C occurs in G r during a step r ≤ l. Furthermore, if C = C is another cycle appearing in G s during a step s < l and both C and C visit goods belonging to the initial endowment of a given agent then C occurs in G t during a step t < r since C occurs in G t (and therefore in G t ).
It remains to consider the case of goods belonging to V h . Let o be a good belonging to V h and let i = δ(o) be the owner of o. Let l be the step of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) where o is visited by a cycle C = p l (o). It is obvious that S l (o) ⊆ V h since we have already described all cycles containing the goods of V \ V h when Algorithm 1 is applied to (e , τ ) and all of them appear also during Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) where no good of V h are present. is implies by de nition of Algorithm 1 that g(τ i (Y l−1 i , Y l−1 i ∪ V r )) ∈ V h holds. We claim that e i ∩ V l = {o} holds i.e., o is the last remaining good of agent i in G l .Assume by contradiction that e i ∩ V l contains another good o = o. Note that o cannot belong to V h because no more than one good can be assigned to agent i during step h of e i ∩ V l = {o} applied to (e, τ ). Moreover, it was shown in the previous paragraph that V l \ V h = V l and E l ⊆ E l hold. Hence, o ∈ V l \ V h implies that o ∈ V l holds. Furthermore, the outgoing edge of o in G l must be the same as the outgoing edge of o in G l . Let (o , f ) be this outgoing edge. By de nition of Algorithm 1, if
is leads to a contradiction with g(
. erefore, we have shown that e i ∩ V l = {o} holds. is implies that C must be the last cycle of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) which contains a good belonging to agent i. e latest result means that cycles including goods of e i \ {o} must occur during earlier steps than l in Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ). Furthermore, e i \ {o} ⊆ K \ V h implies that these cycles must also occur during Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ), and during earlier steps than l. Finally, any good of B that is assigned to agent i during Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) would be part of
holds i.e., the same set of goods is assigned to agent i at step l of Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) then at step h − 1 of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ). is implies
We show now by contradiction that a(τ i (X
is implies by Lemma 1 that
We start our study of Algorithm 2 by the rst while loop (lines 1-6). We show that modi cations performed on preference pro le τ do not change the outcome of Algorithm 1 for the manipulator. To this end, we denote by τ and τ the preference pro les before and a er one loop i.e., modi cation performed in lines 4-5 of Algorithm 2. We denote by
the ATTC graph during step k of Algorithm 1 in the speci c case where τ (resp. τ ) is revealed, and let Y k i (resp. X k i ) denote the set of goods assigned to agent i a er the k rst steps in that case. Let p k (o) (resp. p k (o)) denote the directed path in G k (resp. G k ) which starts from good o, and let S k (o) (resp. S k (o)) denote the set of goods visited by
which starts from good o and nishes at good o (resp. o ).
Note that τ only di ers from τ by its components δ(o) and δ(o ), corresponding to the preferences revealed by the manipulator for goods o and o , respectively. We denote by i o and i o the identities used by the manipulator for goods o and o , respectively. erefore, I = {i o , i o } is the set of identities that do not reveal the same preferences in τ and τ , as de ned in Annexe D. e following lemma shows that replacing τ with τ do not change the outcome of Algorithm 1. Lemma 15. For any agent j ∈ N , ϕ j (e, τ ) = ϕ j (e, τ ) holds.
Proof. Let k denote the step of Algorithm 1 where f, f , o and o arel visited by cycle C in G k (these elements are described in lines 1-2 of Algorithm 2). Let l be the rst step such that o ∈ S l (o), i.e., Finally, let B denote the set of goods visited by C. In order to show that the outcome of Algorithm 1 is preserved for the goods outside of B, we remove the goods of B from initial endowment e and assign these goods to their assignee described in the previous paragraph. Let e denote the initial endowment a er removing the goods of B. We consider now the outcomes of Algorithm 1 applied to both (e , τ ) and (e , τ ). Note that the goods of B are assigned before starting Algorithm 1, as described in Appendix E. is initial assignment ensures that preference pro le τ remains consistent a er removing the goods of B from e. Lemma 14 implies that the outcome of Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) and (e, τ ) (respectively, applied to (e, τ ) and (e , τ )) is the same for the goods of K \ B. erefore, it is enough to show that the goods of K \ B are assigned to the same identities for (e , τ ) and (e , τ ) to conclude the proof. We have shown in the previous paragraph that the goods of B \ {f, f } are assigned to the same agents by Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) and (e, τ ). erefore, these goods are initially assigned to the same agents before applying Algorithm 1 to (e , τ ) and (e , τ ). Furthermore, by assumption on spli ing manipulations we know that the initial endowment of identities i o and i o contain only goods o and o , respectively. erefore, their initial endowments are empty in e and they are ignored during Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) and (e , τ ). All in all, assignments problems (e , τ ) and (e , τ ) only di er by the preference revealed by agents i o and i o which are ignored during Algorithm 1. erefore, Algorithm 1 provides the same outcome for both (e , τ ) and (e , τ ). Figure 11 , cycle C gives rise to two di erent cycles when τ is revealed instead of τ . Furthermore, as mentioned in Lemma 14, any other cycle occurring during Algorithm 1 when τ is revealed will be also occur during Algorithm 1 when τ is revealed. Hence, the number of cycles including at least of the goods belonging to the manipulator is increased by one a er each loop of the initialization phase. erefore, the while loop stop a er at most |e i | steps. Lemma 15 means that the spli ing manipulation obtained at the end of initialization phase provides the same outcome as to the initial spli ing manipulation. Furthermore, no cycle containing more than two goods of the manipulator appears during Algorithm 1 applied to the resulting preference pro le. Figure 11 : Di erences between a path in V k an V k
As illustrated in
A C A C S E o f f ′ o ′ (a) Cycle C in V k o f ′ (b) Cycle C in V l f o ′ (c) Cycle C in V l
F.2 Main Algorithm
Let τ denote the preference pro le obtained at the end of initialization phase, and let τ denote the preference pro le where the manipulator reveals the misreport manipulation τ i computed by Algorithm 2. For sake of simplicity, we assume in (e, τ ) that the manipulator use her ctitious identities when she reveals her preferences. is is without loss of generality because τ i is a path, and therefore the corresponding preferences are not conditional to the goods assigned to the manipulator during Algorithm 1. All other notations remain the same as in the previous subsection, with respect to the new de nition of τ and τ . e following lemma shows that the outcome of Algorithm 1 is the same for the manipulator when τ is revealed instead of τ .
Lemma 16. e goods assigned to the identities of the manipulator during Algorithm 1 are the same when τ is revealed instead of τ .
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on the number of identities used by the manipulator i.e., on the size of the initial endowment of the manipulator.
Base case: Assume rst that e i contains a single good o and I = {i}. Let f be the good assigned to the manipulator when τ is revealed, and l be the rst step of Algorithm 1 when o belongs to S l (f ), i.e. o is reached by the directed path p l (f ). We know by Lemma 10 that f ∈ V l and
o f . Furthermore, we know that (o, f ) belongs to E l because f labels the root of τ i . erefore, during step l of Algorithm 1 when τ is revealed, the concatenation of [p l (f )] o f and (o, f ) forms a cycle containing o. Hence, the same good f is assigned to agent i during Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) and (e, τ ).
Induction step: Let r be the number of goods belonging to the initial endowment of the manipulator. Let C be the cycle chosen in line 7 of Algorithm 2 during the last while loop. Notations o, f and B are de ned as in line 10-11 of Algorithm 2. Note that δ(o) is an identity of the manipulator, and therefore τ δ(o) is the LP-tree computed by Algorithm 2. Hence, f labels the root of τ δ(o) since by de nition this is the last element inserted by function add root in the second loop while of Algorithm 2. Let k denote the step where C occurs in G k , and let l be the rst step of Algorithm 1 where o belongs to S l (f ). Since k is the last step where o ∈ V k , inequality k ≥ l and  (o, f ) forms the same cycle as C in G l . e goods visited by C are assigned to the same agents as they are when τ is revealed.
Finally, let B denotes the set of goods visited by C. In order to show that the outcome is preserved for the goods outside of B, we remove the goods of B from initial endowment e and we assign these goods to their assignee as described in the previous paragraph. Let e denote the initial endowment a er removing the goods of B. We consider now the outcome of the ATTC procedure applied to both (e , τ ) and (e , τ ). Note that the goods of B assigned before starting Algorithm 1, as described in Appendix E. Let τ i denote the outcome of Algorithm 2 applied to (e , τ ), and let τ denote the preference pro le where the identities belonging to the manipulator reveal τ i instead of τ i (other agents reveals the same preference as in τ ). Note rst that the initial endowment of δ(o) is empty in e . erefore this identity is ignored during Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ). is means also that the number of identities used by the manipulator during Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ), or equivalently the number of goods belonging to him in e , is equal to r − 1.
erefore, by induction hypothesis we can state that the outcomes of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) and (e , τ ) are the same for each identity in I belonging to the manipulator. On the other hand, we know by Lemma 14 that the outcomes of Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) and (e , τ ) (respectively for (e, τ ) and (e , τ )) are the same for the goods of K \ B. Furthermore, Lemma 14 states that the sequence of cycles visiting goods of j∈I e j \ {o} is the same for Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) and (e , τ ). erefore, LP-trees τ i and τ i , computed by Algorithm 2 with parameters (e, τ ) and (e , τ ), respectively, only di ers by the position of f i.e., the vertex with label f is not the root of τ i . However, since f does not belong to e and τ i and τ i are paths (and therefore represent lexicographic preferences), the outcomes of Algorithm 1 applied to (e , τ ) and (e , τ ) are the same. All in all, each identity of the manipulator receives the same good during Algorithm 1 applied to (e, τ ) and (e, τ ).
